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Abstract
Borrowing and lending between sovereign parties is modelled as intertemporal barter that
smooths the consumption of a risk-averse party subject to endowment shocks. The surplus an-
ticipated in the relationship offers sufficient incentive for cooperation by all parties, including
any other competitive agents who are potential lenders to the sovereign. The sole punishments
consist of renegotiation-proof changes in the path of future payments. We show that intertem-
poral trade can be sustained in the absence of any exogenous enforcement of lending relation-
ships whatsoever. That is, borrowing and lending are possible under anarchy, and are supported
by punishments that consist of cheating any cheater. Long-term implicit relationships may be
fulfilledas the continual renegotiation of simple incomplete short-term loans. The analysis sug-
gests that the crucial role of the explicit loan contract is the identification of the relationship and
the parties involved.
JEL Numbers: F30, F34.
Keywords: Sovereign debt, intertemporal barter, renegotiation, creditmarketsunderanarchy.1
1. Introduction
Respect for sovereign immunity has long been recognized as a crucial constraint facing
lenders to sovereign states (see, for example, Keynes [1924]). Intertemporal exchange is re-
stricted by the absence of a supranational legal authority to enforce the terms of agreements.
The history of lending to sovereigns shows the consequences of lenders’ inability to enforce
repayments specified in loan contracts. Overall payments on sovereign loans during the 19th
and20th century have not come close todischarging theoriginal explicitcontractual obligations
in an overwhelming number of cases, and many defaults have been documented.1
Although debt service has fallen far short of formal contractual obligations, the lack of col-
lateral has not meant that lenders did not recover their principal on average. In fact, economic
historians have shown that lending to sovereign nations has been very profitable overall, with
average returns comparing favorably to those on contemporaneous domestic government debt
issued in lender nations.2 Even loans in default were frequently profitable ex post.3
It has been widely noted that when payment deviations or defaults occurred there was gener-
ally no abrupt termination of the borrower-lender relationship as often seen in domestic bank-
ruptcy. Instead, most sovereign debt relationships have continued through renegotiation under
the guise of reschedulings, partial payments, new loans, debt repurchases or similar financial
arrangements. Agreement has been achieved in almost all instances on a case by case basis
through bilateral negotiation.4 Indeed, all parties may view a default as an implicit contingent
outcome of the underlying international financial relationship.5
The literature on sovereign borrowing explains its persistence by identifying (explicitly or
implicitly) some exogenous means of enforcement as an alternative to the allocation of col-
lateral by a government capable of commitment. This paper presents a model that assumes
no exogenous means of enforcement of intertemporal exchange whatsoever. Y et, it is shown
that international intertemporal trade can be sustained in perfect equilibrium using punishment
threats that are proof to renegotiation. In our model, long-term debt relationships are sustain-
able, although they are continually subject to renegotiation and the threat of potential entry by
competing lenders. We demonstratethat intertemporal exchange thatserves tosmooth borrower
consumption is possible under the anarchy that characterizes international relations.62
The presence of government as a means of contract enforcement is crucial in domestic credit
markets, where loans are frequently collateralized. In a simple loan, a lender completes her
obligation by making an initial payment to the borrower in exchange for contingent rights to
claim collateral. These rights are valuable because of the credible commitment of the govern-
ment to reallocate collateral across agents. Long-term relationships need not be an intrinsic
feature of lending in this case.
The wide array of existing models of sovereign debt can similarly be characterized as depen-
dent on positive or negativeawards administeredby a third party whose credibility is assumed.7
For example, in the bargaining model of Bulow and Rogoff [1989a], it is implicit that a third
party existstoprotecttheexportingcountry from interferenceinitstrade. Theexportingcountry
sells this right to protection to the ‘‘lender’’ by taking a ‘‘loan.’’ In this case, the exporter and the
lender Nash bargain each periodover the amount paid as ‘‘protection money’’ to keep the lender
from interfering with the country’s trade. Essentially, the lender buys a monopoly franchise to
the country’s exports by making the initial payment, and ‘‘repayments’’ are the equilibrium sur-
pluses going to the monopsonist each period. If the lender held this right initially, there would
be no ‘‘loan’’ and subsequent transactions would be the same, but it would be more obvious that
the relationship is one of repeated contemporaneous bilateral trade.
Some examples of contemporaneous trade of goods for sanctions are found by Bulow and
Rogoff[1989a]inthehistory ofsovereignborrowing. However,evidenceofamarkedreluctance
on the part of lenders or their governments to interfere with a non-performing debtor’s trade
is found by Eichengreen and Portes [1989b] in the historical record, by Sachs [1989] in the
contemporary experience of Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, and in the recent handling of the Asian
financial crisis.
Anothermotiveforrepayment,introducedtoformal modelsby EatonandGersovitz[1981],is
thepossibility of interferencewithacountry’sintertemporal tradethroughanembargoon further
loans for smoothing its consumption given a fluctuating income stream.8 In equilibrium, the
agents play standardtrigger strategies: any deviation from the equilibrium path of intertemporal
trade triggers reversion to permanent autarky. These punishments, however, create losses for
both the lender and the borrower in that they could be better off returning to a new equilibrium3
foresaking punishment by mutual agreement.
When there are at least two potential lenders, all of them must participate in punishment of
the borrower to maintain credibility of the threat. If intertemporal exchange can be sustained,
this requires that other lenders forego a share of the gains from trade to punish a recalcitrant
borrower. Bulow and Rogoff [1989b] argue that reputation alone cannot work when there are
other potential lenders and, therefore, thirdparty enforcementof lender seniority rightsis neces-
sary. Otherwise, the borrower can simply abandon her relationship with one lender when she is
required to make a repayment and start up another, achieving more surplus, with a new entrant.
But they implicitly assume the new lender can commit to insure the borrower, that is, to make
future contingent payments that require external enforcement.9
We model intertemporal barter using an infinitely-repeated game with at least two partici-
pants. Theborrower’spreference for smooth consumption given astochasticendowmentstream
generatesthegainsfromintertemporal trade.10 Inequilibrium,agentsmakestate-contingentuni-
lateral payments to each other on different dates. No agent can force a payment from another,
either directly or by appeal to a third party. Every payment is voluntary; the sole incentive for
making a payment is the increase in surplus for the payee looking forward in the relationship
given the prior behavior of others. This applies equally to all agents, whether identified as a
borrower or lender.
In a perfect equilibrium, intertemporal trade is supported by punishment threats that reallo-
cate the surplus in the long-term relationship. Agents can always renegotiate the terms of any
relationship, including punishments. In contrast to other formal models of sovereign debt, our
equilibria are renegotiation-proof so that future mutual gains from intertemporal trade are not
foregone in punishment.11 Strategies for all agents are shown to exist such that the equilibrium
payments path andall punishmentthreatsareParetoefficientwithin thesetof all perfectequilib-
rium payments paths for the repeated game. With a borrower and a single lender, punishments
cannot be renegotiated to mutual benefit. Under potential entry by competing lenders, the pun-
ishments assure that the borrower cannot defect and successfully negotiate a new consumption-
smoothing relationship with another lender. The equilibrium is proof to renegotiation by any
coalition.4
Thepunishmentsdemonstratedhaveasimpleandappealinginterpretation. They imply thata
short-livedpaymentsmoratorium isimposedonany participantwhofailstomakeanequilibrium
state-contingent payment. The long-term consumption-smoothing relationship resumes as soon
as the punished agent makes a payment sufficient to give the surplus to the other party. These
punishmentsareaseffectiveasthethreatof permanentloan autarky,butunliketrigger strategies,
these threats are credible. If a competing lender does not respect such a moratorium imposed
on the borrower, the strategies of the other lenders induce the borrower to cheat this new lender.
These‘‘cheatthecheater’’ punishmentssustainintertemporal exchangeunder anarchy. Thistype
of punishment has indeed been observed in trading relations, for example, by Greif [1993] for
the Maghribi traders of the late Medieval period.
Borrowing for the purpose of consumption smoothing is sustainable without international
legal enforcement of seniority privileges or other restrictions on the entry of lenders from dif-
ferent countries. Our analysis predicts international lending but not insurance in the absence of
exogenous international contract enforcement. In Bulow and Rogoff [1989b], Atkeson [1991]
and other models, ‘‘lenders’’ offer insurance contracts that require the external enforcement of
explicit state-contingent payments. Equilibrium payments in our model follow an implicit con-
tract that does not require interference with the sovereignty of either creditor or debtor nations.
Our equilibrium is consistent with the observation that international lending with frequent rene-
gotiationof short-term loancontractsratherthaninternational insuranceisthepredominantform
of financial flows to developing countries. We offer a new interpretation of the role of simple
short-term loan contracts in international lending. In the absence of exogenous enforcement,
the primary function of a contract in our model is to identify the parties to long-term financial
relationships.
Thenextsection of thepaperpresentsthemodel. Theanalysisbeginswiththecaseof asingle
lender(two-playergame)inSections3and4andisextendedtothecaseof many possiblelenders
in Section 5. We discuss the implementation of the long-term equilibrium relationship using
short-term contracts in Section 6 and contrast the implications of our model with the literature.
The last section concludes.5
2. Model
We use a simple model of an infinite-horizon economy in discrete time in which there are
gains from intertemporal exchange. There are two types of infinite-lived agents, and each re-
ceives an endowment of a single non-storable good each period. For simplicity, we assume that
one agent is risk-averse and has a stochastic endowment stream. There are L ¸ 1 risk-neutral
agents, each of whom receives a constant endowment stream. For convenience, the risk-averse
agent is called the borrower, and each risk-neutral agent is called a lender. To make the expo-
sition easier to follow, we refer to the borrower as she and to lenders as he. The endowment of
each agent in any given period, as well as all past and present actions, are common knowledge.
An agent can give part or all of an endowment to others, but no agent can force another to
make a payment either through direct confiscation or by appeal to an external authority. More
generally and in contrast to previous literature, there is no third party to force the borrower or
any lender to pay part of a future endowment to any other agent. At any time, an agent can
always choose to consume his or her endowment.









where u(ct+i) is increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable, and 0 < ¯ < 1.
The expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of consumption plans, (ct+1; ct+2; ::: ),
conditional on information available on date t. The borrower’s endowment is observed at the
beginning of each period, before any payments or consumption take place. The preferences for











t+i equals consumption in period t+i by lender l and the expectation is again taken with
respect to date t information. We assume that the discount factor, ¯, is the same for both the
borrowerandall lenders,toconcentrateonborrowingforthepurposeofconsumptionsmoothing
without consumption tilting.
For simplicity, the borrower’s endowment is assumed to be independent and identically dis-6
tributed each period over a finite number, N > 1, of realizations, labelled in increasing order,
y1 < y2 < ::: < yN. Each lender’s endowment is constant and set equal to yN, for simplic-
ity. However, every result for the model goes through if the borrower’s endowment follows a
Markov chain displayingfirst-order stochasticdominance.12 Theborrower’s endowmentatdate
t is denoted yt.
Because every payment is voluntary, at any time an agent can stop making payments and
consume his or her endowment thereafter. We define the surplus for an agent under a given
consumption plan as the difference between the utility realized under the plan and the utility
achieved under permanent autarky. The borrower’s surplus at time t is
V
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i[u(ct+i) ¡ u(yt+i)] (3)















The inability to commit future payments implies that the incentive constraints, V b
t ¸ 0 and
V l
t ¸ 0, for each l, hold at all times t ¸ 1.
Interactionsbetweentheagentscanbemodelledasarepeatednon-cooperativegamewithL+
1 players. On each date a stage of the repeated game is played. In the single-period game, each
agent can make a non-negative payment to any of the other agents. The borrower’s payments
cannot total more than her current endowment. Each lender’s total payments cannot exceed his
endowment in any period. The borrower’s single-period payoff in the game is [u(ct) ¡ u(yt)],
and the single-period payoff for lender l equals (cl




t). The payments made by an agent j to the other L agents on date t is
denoted a
j
t, a vector of length L .
In the case of a single lender, the borrower pays the lender ab
t, 0 · ab
t · yt, and the lender
pays the borrower al
t, 0 · al





t], respectively. Paying nothing to anyone else is a dominant
strategy in the single-period game, so that payments autarky is the unique Nash equilibrium for7
that game.
For the infinitely-repeated game, each agent makes a sequence of state-contingent payments
totheotherparticipantsovertime,andintertemporal exchangeispossible. Paymentscanbecon-
ditioned on the current and past states of nature and on the past payments made by all agents.
The history of the game is given by the sequences of past endowment realizations for the bor-
rower and of past payments by everyone. Each possible history of the game up to any date t
defines a subgame of the repeated game beginning at date t. The borrower’s strategy specifies
the payments she makes contingent on her endowment at all dates for every possible subgame,
and similarly for each lender. An equilibrium for the game specifies the strategy for each agent.
In any period, the borrower’s payoff for the remainder of the repeated game is her expected
surplus, as defined by equation 3, from the consumption streams resulting from a sequence of
state-contingent payments from datet forward. Lenders’ payoffs aredefined by equation 4. For














































A sequence of state-contingent payments for all agents is called a path of the repeated game.
We show below that in general, equilibrium payments are contingent on the current and past
endowments of the borrower even though her endowment stream is i.i.d. Consumption may
only be smoothed partially in equilibrium in this economy.
3. Equilibrium with a Borrower and a Single Lender
ThereareParetogainsfromrisksharinginthiseconomy; state-contingentpaymentsexistthat
give each agent higher expected utility than under permanent autarky. But the inabilities of the
borrowerandlendertocommitmay preventefficientrisksharing. Theincentiveconstraintshold
at all dates for each participant, so we first require that an equilibrium of the repeated game be
perfect. One perfect equilibrium is permanent repetition of the single-period Nash equilibrium,
thatis, permanentautarky. Thetheory of infinitely-repeatednon-cooperativegames impliesthat8
there are perfect equilibria of this game that Pareto dominate permanent autarky if the discount
rate is low enough.
Intertemporal exchangeisenforcedby punishmentthreats in aperfectequilibrium. Failureto
make an equilibrium payment to the other party increases the current consumption of an agent.
To be effective for supporting intertemporal trade, a punishment must reduce the discounted
stream of future surpluses for the agent enough to offset the single-period gain. Refusing to
pay the other agent is the most severe retaliation that the borrower or lender can make in this
economy. A permanent payments embargo minimizes the maximum intertemporal surplus that
each agent can attain. But permanent autarky is not immune to renegotiation between lenders
and the borrower because it eliminates all future mutual gains from intertemporal exchange.
In the absence of commitment opportunities, renegotiation of punishments to mutual benefit is
natural to consider. Our second requirement is that an equilibrium be renegotiation-proof.
In the the case of a single lender, a perfect equilibrium will be renegotiation-proof if the
borrower andthe lender cannotagreetoabandon theequilibrium for anotherperfectequilibrium
after any history. There are many definitions of renegotiation-proofness in the literature on
repeated games.13 In this economy, a perfect equilibrium is shown to exist that satisfies all the
existing notions and supports intertemporal exchange. In Section 5, renegotiation-proofness is
extendedtocoalition-proofnessforthecaseofmany potential lendersby requiringthatcoalitions
of twoormoreparticipantscannotmutually agreetoabandon theequilibrium foranotherperfect
equilibrium.
To find renegotiation-proof equilibria for the single-lender case, we first characterize the set
of all perfect equilibria. Thiscan bedone by usingpermanent autarky as a punishmentthreatfor
any deviation from a proposed equilibrium payments path.14 If the borrower fails to make the
payment, ab
t, required by the given path, then the punishment begins and her surplus starting the
next period, V b
t+1, equals zero; similarly, the lender realizes zero future surplus in equilibrium if






















































































Inequalities 7 and 8 impose constraints on the stream of net payments made between the bor-
rower and the lender on the left-hand side. The punishment payoffs on the right-hand side are
minimized if only a one-way payment equal to the net payment is made at any time. Under
a unilateral payments path, the highest single-period payoff to an agent who deviates is zero.
This minimizes the present-value payoff either agent can achieve by deviating under any pun-
ishmentthreat(sincepunishmentsbeginafterdeviation). Makingsimultaneouspaymentsserves
to reduce the efficacy of punishment threats. Because only net payments enter agents’ utilities,
restricting payments to be unilateral can increase the opportunities for consumption smoothing
in perfect equilibrium. Therefore, the model predicts that we should not observe agreements
to make two-way payments simultaneously.15 Whenever the net payment to the borrower is
positive, only the lender’s constraint (inequality 8) can be binding, and conversely.
A perfect equilibrium that fully smooths the borrower’s consumption exists if the following
constraints are satisfied for all states of nature for some constant consumption c:




i[u(c) ¡ u(yt+i)] ¸ 0
and




i(yt+i ¡ c) ¸ 0:
Because u(c) is concave, there is a solution to these inequalities for every state if ¯ is larger
than some ¯, where 1 > ¯ > 0. The appendix demonstrates that there is another value of the
discount factor, b ¯, that is positive and less than ¯ such that the incentive constraints cannot all
be satisfied except under autarky if ¯ is less than b ¯. Our first proposition summarizes these
observations so far.10
Proposition 1: The borrower’s consumption can be at least partially smoothed in perfect
equilibrium if the discount factor is greater than b ¯. It can be fully smoothed if the discount
factor is at least ¯, where 1 > ¯ > b ¯ > 0.
If ¯ > b ¯, then there are perfect equilibrium payment paths giving both the borrower and
lender positive future expected surplus at any date. That is,
¯EtV
b
t+1 > 0; ¯EtV
l
t+1 > 0
and the incentive constraints, V b
t+1 ¸ 0, V l
t+1 ¸ 0, hold for both agents in each state of nature
for t + 1. This positive surplus gives an agent the incentive to make unilateral state-contingent
payments to the other. At least some consumption smoothing is possible under perfection.
Valuesfor b ¯ and¯ canbecalculatedgiven thestandarddeviationof outputandanempirically
sensible choice for the coefficient of relative risk aversion (¾) for developing country debtors
using a two-state example. For a coefficent of variation of the GDP equal to 4% (average for
Latin America in the 1980s) and ¾ equal to four, b ¯ = 0:92 and ¯ = 0:96. For ¾ = 3, b ¯ = 0:955
and ¯ = 0:978. Partial smoothing is still possible for a discount rate exceeding 3% when ¾
equals two and the coefficient of variation of GDP is 3% or more.
The set of all perfect equilibrium payment paths generates a utility possibility set for each
possible value of the borrower’s endowment, yn. This is depicted in Figure 1 in terms of V b
t and
V l
t for any yt 2 fy1;:::;yNg. The set is convex and has a continuous frontier (see the proof of
Proposition 2). The utility possibility frontier gives the surplus for each agent for equilibrium
paths that are Pareto-efficientwithin the setof perfectequilibrium paths. These are constrained-
efficient; they are not necessarily Pareto-optimal. Some efficient perfect equilibrium paths are
Pareto-optimal when ¯ ¸ ¯, since complete consumption smoothing is possible in this case.
None are when ¯ > ¯ > b ¯, although efficient perfect equilibrium paths partially smooth bor-
rower consumption and Pareto-dominate permanent autarky in that case. An efficient perfect
equilibrium path must produce surpluses for the two agents on the utility possibility frontier in
every statefor each date.16 Thepaymentpaths associatedwith any distribution of welfareon the
frontier are found by solvinga dynamic programming problem, as discussed in the next section.
By the envelope theorem, the utility possibility frontier is downward-sloping: reducing the
lender’s surplus by decreasing the borrower’s current net payment, raises the borrower’s surplus.11
Asaconsequence, perfectequilibrium pathsexistthatareefficientbutgivezerosurplustoeither
the borrower or lender. The payoffs for these paths are the intercepts of the frontier with each
axis, points A and B in Figure 1. In either of these paths, future payments smooth, at least
partially, the borrower’s consumption. Because expected future surplus (EtV l
t+1 or EtV b
t+1) can
never be negative, an agent realizes positive surplus whenever he or she receives a payment. At
A the borrower’s surplus is zero, and the lender realizes all the surplus from the efficient perfect
equilibrium in state yt. The borrower cannot receive payment from the lender on date t if the
allocation of surplus is given by point A. Because there is positive surplus in the intertemporal
exchange relationship beginning at A on date t, the borrower will receive contingent payments
in equilibrium in some future states. This implies that the borrower makes the first payment in
the equilibrium path starting at time t with the division of surplus given by A.
ThepaymentpathsthatcorrespondtopointsAandB can beusedaspunishmentsthatarejust
as strong as permanent autarky, but unlike autarky, they are not Pareto-dominated by any other
perfect equilibrium path. Any perfect equilibrium path can be supported by these punishments.
Therefore, we can select any efficient perfect equilibrium path beginning in the first period for
each possible state of nature as an equilibrium path. The associated punishments are the paths
that provide surpluses at points A and B for any date and state. In every possible subgame,
the equilibrium payoffs are on the Pareto frontier of all perfect equilibrium payoffs, so that this
equilibrium is renegotiation-proof by all definitions in the literature. These arguments, proved
in the appendix, are summarized as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: A payments path that smooths the borrower’s consumption, at least partially,
can be sustained in a renegotiation-proof equilibrium for any ¯ > b ¯. This holds, in particular,
for all efficient perfect equilibrium paths.
4. Payments Dynamics with a Single Lender in and out of
Equilibrium
Thenextstepistocharacterizepaymentdynamicsinarenegotiation-proof equilibrium witha
single lender. The payment dynamics in any equilibrium path or punishment path can be found
by solving for the borrower’s consumption dynamics in efficient perfect equilibrium. This is12
done by solving a constrained dynamic programming problem. In every state for each date,
renegotiation-proof punishments can be used to hold the borrower’s or the lender’s surplus to
zero.
Theconstraineddynamicprogramsolvesfortheutility possibility frontiertreatingthelender’s
surplus as a state variable in each state of nature in the solution path. This is denoted V l
t (yt).








with respect to the borrower’s consumption, ct, and V l
t+1(yt+1) for yt+1 = y1;:::;yN, subject to
















t ;yt) is the utility possibility frontier for date t when the borrower’s endowment is yt,
expressed as a function of the lender’s surplus. V l
t must be chosen so that the borrower’s surplus
is non-negative in the maximum. A solution is an implicit contract specifying the borrower’s
current consumption and the promised surplus for the lender the next period.
Thisprogrammingproblem hasbeensolvedby ThomasandWorrall [1988]intheiranalysisof
(non-renegotiation-proof)wagecontracts.17 Althoughall ofourresultsandargumentsholdifthe
borrower’s endowment is generalized to follow a Markov chain displaying first-order stochastic
dominance, we use the i.i.d. case to take advantage of the existing proofs of the dynamics for
brevity’s sake. The equilibrium path of state-contingent payments for any division of the initial
total surplus, V l
1 and V b
1 is unique because u(c) is strictly concave.
Using the first-order and envelope conditions for an interior solution gives the Euler condi-













t+1 are non-negative Lagrange multipliers for each state, n = 1;:::;N, and
cn
t+1 is state-contingent consumption in t+1. The multipliers are associated with each incentive
constraint, 10and11, respectively.18 In any particular stateof nature, an incentive constraintcan
only be binding for one of the two agents, so that at most one of 'n
t+1 or Ã
n
t+1 can be positive in13
any given state (both can be zero).
TheEulerconditionimpliesthattheborrower’sconsumptioniscompletely smoothedbetween
today andtomorrowif neitherincentiveconstraintbindsin tomorrow’sstateof nature. If Ã
n
t+1 >
0 for state n, the lender’s constraint binds and he realizes zero surplus in state n. In this case,
the borrower’s consumption falls (cn
t+1 < ct) because the lender is unable to pay any more to the
borrower in that state in perfect equilibrium. If 'm
t+1 > 0 for state m, then the borrower realizes
zero surplus in state m, and her consumption rises (cm
t+1 > ct) because she is unwilling to make
any larger payment to the lender in that state.
Because exogenous contract enforcement is unavailable, risk-sharing is limited to what can
be sustained by endogenous punishments. The borrower’s consumption is smoothed as much as
possible in perfect equilibrium. The Euler conditions imply that the borrower’s consumption at
date t depends her endowment at t and on her consumption in the previous period. Therefore,
payments follow a Markov chain even though the borrower’s endowment is i.i.d. unless her
consumption is fully smoothed.
Each point on the utility possibility frontier for yn corresponds to a different current con-
sumption for the borrower in equilibrium. Point A gives the borrower her lowest equilibrium
consumption in state n, cn. Moving along the utility possibility frontier toward B, her equilib-
rium consumption rises monotonically to a maximum, ¹ cn. Thomas and Worrall prove that the
upper and lower bounds on the borrower’s consumption are ordered as c1 < c2 < ::: < cN and
¹ c1 < ¹ c2 < ::: < ¹ cN. Along with the Euler conditions, these imply that if the borrower gets
no surplus in the lowest state, y1, she receives zero surplus (over her autarky utility) in every
possible state the next period. Therefore, c1 = y1and her consumption is never less than the
lowest possible value of her endowment. Similarly, the borrower’s consumption is never higher
than yN, and ¹ cN = yN. Only the lender ever makes a payment in the lowest state, and only
the borrower ever makes a payment in the highest. For intermediate states, cn < yn < ¹ cn if
¯ > b ¯.19 If ¯ ¸ ¯, cN · ¹ c1so that full smoothing of the borrower’s consumption is possible in
some equilibria.
Figure2aportraysconsumptionintervalswhentherearethreepossibleendowmentlevelsand
¯ > ¯. The vertical bars show the range for the borrower’s consumption in renegotiation-proof14
equilibrium paths for each state. An equilibrium path is depicted by arrows. The borrower’s
endowment first equalsy2, and shegets all of the surplus from the equilibrium (anticipating free
entry by lenders in the next section). The lender makes the first payment, equal to ¹ c2 minus y2.
The arrows show the borrower’s consumption and net payments as her endowment rises to y3,
then falls to y1 and returns to y2. In Figure 2a, complete smoothing is possible, but it is not
immediately achieved for this initial division of surplus between the two agents.20 In the steady
state, the borrower’s consumption is smoothed and equals ¹ c1.
Figure 2b shows an example for ¯ > ¯ > b ¯ starting in state y1. The arrows depict a steady-
state path beginning with payment by the lender. The borrower’s endowment rises from y1to y2,
then to y3 and back to y2. Because consumption can only be partially smoothed, the borrower’s
steady-state consumption depends on her endowment and her past endowments via her past
consumption level. She receives a payment in the middle state if her endowment is falling and
makes a paymentif itis rising. The four consumption levels of the sample path shown in Figure
2b are the steady-state realizations for this example. Both figures show that the division of
surplus between the borrower and lender varies over time with the state of nature.
Suppose the borrower decides not to make her payment in her highest endowment state at
some date t in the example of Figure 2b. The renegotiation-proof punishment is a new equilib-
rium path with all the surplus going to the lender. This is a payments path that begins in period
t+1 with the borrower’s consumption equal to cn for whichever state yn occurs. Punishment of
the borrower beginning in state y2 is depicted in Figure 3a. In the borrower’s punishment, the
lender does not make a payment in any state until after the borrower has made a payment that
gives the lender all the equilibrium continuation surplus. Note that in the example, the mora-
torium on payments to the borrower lasts only one period, but her surplus in punishment is as
severe as it would be under the incredible threat of permanent autarky.
Iftheborrowerfailstomakeherpunishmentpaymentattimet,thepunishmentsimply restarts
in period t + 1. The lender still makes no payments to the borrower until after she has made a
payment that gives him all the surplus gained from renewing intertemporal exchange. It does
not matter how long it takes for her to make this payment. As soon as she does, a new efficient
perfectequilibrium pathbegins. Thus,thelenderpunishestheborrowerby imposingapayments15
moratorium that can be as short as one period. Following through on his punishment threat is
both the lender’s myopic and forward-looking best action. The borrower is just as well off
making her payment in punishment as she is continuing to refuse.
If the lender fails to make an equilibrium payment, then he is similarly punished. The bor-
rower makes no payments to the lender until after he has made a payment that gives all of the
surplus from a new efficient perfect equilibrium path to her. The borrower imposes a payments
moriatorium thatendswiththefirstpaymentby thelender. Apunishmentofthelenderbeginning
in state y3 is depicted in Figure 3b.
The equilibrium payments path can be interpreted using a sequence of one-period loan con-
tracts with state-contingent repayments. In the absence of commitment, long-term relationships
can be supported using a sequence of one-period contracts, as shown by Fudenberg, Holmstrom
and Milgrom [1990] and Rey and Salanie [1990] for long-term agency relationships. As they
argue, longer maturity contracts are unenforceable when they specify behavior that cannot be
supported by a sequence of one-period contracts.
Each contract consists of an amount lent, `t(yt), at date t and state-contingent repayments,
Rt+1(yt+1), for date t + 1 in each state of nature. Each contract earns zero expected profit,
`t = ¯EtRt+1(yt+1). The loan prinicipal, `t(yt), equals ct ¡ yt ¡ Rt(yt), and the net payment
to the borrower is `t(yt) ¡ Rt(yt). The lender’s surplus is
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i¡t(¡`i + ¯ Ri(yi))] = Rt(yt);
where the second equality is due to rearrangement.
Theincentiveconstraintforthelenderisequivalenttotherestrictionthatevery state-contingent
repayment be non-negative. This rules out some insurance contracts by imposing an inequality
constraint on Rt+1. This is another way of seeing why consumption-smoothing may be incom-
plete. We can think of the long-term relationship with state-contingent payments as guided by
a series of simple standard loan contracts with repayments renegotiated ex post. The contract
simply states a maximum repayment, at least as great as the highest actual repayment for the
next period.21 Our restriction that the lender cannot commit is equivalent to the constraint that
renegotiation of a loan repayment does not result in a negative repayment. A negative repay-
ment, Rt, implies that the lender makes a payment that is unprofitable in expectation when he16
makes it. A negative value for Rt would make him worse off than if he left the relationship
altogether; therefore, such a ‘‘renegotiation’’ would not be renegotiation-proof. Renegotiation
of repayments may appear in accounting schemes as debt write-downs, reschedulings, or new
concessionary loans without changing the equilibrium path of net payments in any way.22
Itmakessensetodistinguishbetweendebtandinsurance,butmuchof theliteratureonforeign
lendingdoesnotdoso. BulowandRogoff [1989b], Worrall [1990] andAtkeson [1991] all allow
commitment by the lender. The solutions for the Worrall and Atkeson models explicitly show
that the lender’s surplus is negative in some states in equilibrium.23 Negative repayments play
the key role in the argument of Bulow and Rogoff[1989b] against the possibility of reputational
equilibria as discussed below.
5. Self-enforcement with Potential Entrants
In practice, markets such as that for international lending have more than two participants.
In this section, we prove that intertemporal exchange can be sustained under anarchy in the
presence of potential entry by other lenders. A renegotiation-proof equilibrium is constructed
thatmaintainsthebilateral consumption-smoothingrelationshipdescribedabovein thepresence
of more lenders. Our equilibrium is extended to one that is invulnerable to renegotiation within
coalitions, and for clarity is called a coalition-proof equilibrium. The key to our demonstration
is that all payments are made voluntarily looking forward in equilibrium.
The problem that motivates the extension of our equilibrium is as follows. Suppose that
the borrower fails to pay her lender as required on some date. Then she also fails to make
the subsequent state-contingent payment necessary to end the lender’s payments moratorium
under the renegotiation-proof punishment for the two-agent economy. Instead, she starts a new
consumption-smoothing path with a second lender. Both the borrower andsecondlender appear
to be able to divide the positive surplus between them, while the first lender receives nothing.
The strategy for the first lender needs to include a reaction to interference in the borrower’s
punishment by the second lender. The punishments we propose are a form of ‘‘cheating the
cheater.’’ Suppose that the borrower and first lender follow a efficient plan for the two-agent
economy beginning in the first period. Under free entry by lenders, the borrower will get all the17
surplus at date 1. If she deviates, the borrower is punished as in the two-agent equilibrium: a
moratorium on payments by any lender remains in force until she makes a payment to the first
lender giving him all the surplus gained by starting a new intertemporal exchange path with
him. If another lender makes a payment to the borrower while she is being punished, then he
has deviated from the ongoing punishment. A new punishment, this time of the deviant lender,
begins.
The second lender, like the first, cannot be forced by any exogenous punishment to make
payments. He pays the borrower in a given state only if he thinks he will be repaid at some
future date. Likewise, the borrower pays the second lender in a future state only if it raises her
surplus in equilibrium atthattime. In a statein which sheisexpected to repay the secondlender,
theoriginal lender(orathirdlender)canoffertostartanother(perfectequilibrium)intertemporal
exchangepathwithherthatbeginswithasmallerpaymentby theborrower. Thisgivesherhigher
surplus, so she should not repay the second lender. The original lender can induce the borrower
to abandon any new intertemporal exchange relationship she might form.
Under these strategies, the second lender never pays the borrower in perfect equilibrium of
a subgame reached by the borrower cheating. Other lenders respect the punishment of the bor-
rower in equilibrium. Using this type of strategy, if the borrower gives a new lender a payment,
in any subgame, the new lender should cheat her by never repaying in equilibrium. Similarly, if
a new lender cheats by paying the borrower, she maximizes her surplus by cheating him.
These strategies imply that a renegotiation-proof equilibrium path for the bilateral case can
be made proof to possible renegotiations between the borrower and new lenders. Under ‘‘cheat
the cheater,’’ a coalition of the borrower and a new lender, or group of new lenders, cannot
attain for themselves payoffs superior to permanent autarky. The appendix formally defines the
equilibrium and proves the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Intertemporal exchange can be sustained in the absence of all external en-
forcement even if there is more than one potential lender. An equilibrium exists that supports
constrained-efficient smoothing of the borrower’s consumption and is immune to any mutually
beneficial renegotiation between agents.
The proof demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium that generates an efficient perfect18
equilibrium path in every possible subgame of the repeated game.24
ThisresultcontradictstheclaimofBulowandRogoff[1989b]thatthethreatofnon-cooperation
alone cannot support lending and repayment in an infinitely repeated game of smoothing a sov-
ereign’s consumption. In their proof, however, they allow lenders to offer contracts that bind
them to make future payments enforced by an external authority.25 With exogenous enforce-
mentof lenders’ agreements, a new lender can offer an insurance contract to the borrower under
which she pays first and he credibly commits to repay. In a model with asymmetric exogenous
enforcement, intertemporal trade to smooth the risk-averter’s consumption is possible, butit can
be initiated only by a payment from the party that cannot commit to the party that can. Bulow
and Rogoff show that under their assumptions international insurance is possible. In contrast,
we show that international lending under anarchy is possible.26
6. Sovereignty, Debt Contracts and Renegotiation
The equilibrium sequences of payments between the sovereign borrower and a lender can
be interpreted as the equilibrium outcome of lending and repayment guided by crude debt con-
tracts that are renegotiated without benefit of exogenous enforcement. The explicit terms of
repayment on loans to sovereigns are not generally followed in equilibrium, in contrast with
the case for many domestic lending relationships. The designation of collateral is typical for
domestic lending in developed market economies. In a simple contract, the lender’s obligation
is discharged at the initiation of the loan. If a borrower who defaults loses collateral of greater
value than the repayment, adherence to the explicit conditions of the loan is subgame perfect;
renegotiation is not an issue. This requires the existence, capability and commitment of a third
party to allocate collateral contingent on debtor performance. If these conditions are fulfilled,
lender commitmentis moot, andborrower performance is induced by the commitmentof a third
party to enforce contracts.
International loans are different because sovereign immunity limits the capacity of third par-
ties to enforce explicit contracts through the international reallocation of collateral. Our model
captureslendingandrepaymentbetweensovereignsby assumingthatpaymentsareonly madeif
doing so raises equilibrium surplus looking forward at the time of payment. Lenders are agents19
who make payments voluntarily on the expectation of future repayments and not under force by
a third party.
A common approach of the literature has been to reverse the balance of commitment in the
collateralizedloan contractby assumingthatthelenderalwayscommitstofulfill any contractual
obligations(aswouldbeplausibleif thelender’sobligationswerecollateralized).27 In two-agent
models, such collateralization makes the threat of reverting to autarky a perfect equilibrium
punishment for the borrower. This can support financial relationships of the type discussed by
Grossman and van Huyck [1988] and interpreted with explicit dynamics by Worrall [1990] and
Atkeson [1991]. In models with moreparties, Bulow andRogoff [1989b] show that asymmetric
enforcement binding only on lenders can render this threat of punishment incredible.
Lender commitment requires an explicit contract to inform third parties of the commitments
undertaken. In our model, thereis noexogenousparty toenforceany commitments, sothat with
a single lender and borrower, no explicit contract is needed; explicitness, after all, is for third
parties. With potential free entry by other lenders and no exogenous enforcement, an explicit
crude debt contract could play the modest role of identifying the lender making the initial loan
and of disclosing the terms of repayment. In the equilibrium demonstrated for this economy,
all lenders but the first simply need to know that an efficient bilateral relationship was formed.
Then they recognizethatthereis nothing tobe gained by makingpayments to theborrower. The
other lenders do not need to participate in the negotiation of the implicit contract between the
borrower and her lender. They just need to be informed of the bilateral relationship so that they
cooperate in equilibrium.
A crude debt contract may serve to publicize the relationship between the borrower and her
lender as a ‘‘tombstone’’ advertisement. This publicity facilitates cooperation by the other po-
tential lenders by making prior relationships common knowledge. In common parlance, such
cooperation is called ‘‘respect for seniority,’’ meaning that other lenders will not deal with the
borrower until her obligation to the initial lender has been discharged. In contrast, much of the
earlier literature assumes exogenous enforcement of lender seniority by the lenders’ govern-
ments: any payments to a junior lender by a borrower in default are reallocated by force of law
to the senior lender. Under the asymmetric commitment opportunities assumed in Bulow and20
Rogoff [1989b], seniority enforcement must extendto other financial transactions (in particular,
the cash-in-advance insurance transactions) if international lending is to occur.
7. Conclusion
Borrowing and lending between sovereigns can be viewed as intertemporal barter without
exogenous enforcementof commitments. The surplus in a consumption-smoothing relationship
by itself provides sufficient incentive for cooperation by the borrower, lender and any potential
lenders along the equilibrium path and in punishments if an agent has deviated. The explicit or
implicit assumption in other models of sovereign debt that a third party is available to enforce
commitments, including respect for lender seniority or monopoly rights in commodity trade, is
inessential to sustain lending to sovereign states.
By modelling renegotiation-proof intertemporal exchange, our model captures the essence
of credit transactions without collateral. We show that intertemporal barter under anarchy is
feasible without appealing to the threat of exogenous force (Hirshleifer [1995], p. 28). Both
sides of the market have symmetric lack of capacity for commitment, so we directly affirm that
reputation alone can sustain intertemporal exchange including cases where the initial payment
flows to the party whose consumption is smoothed, as observed in lending to sovereign states.
Reputation here refers purely to the past actions of the participants; under common knowledge
there isnoneed for an agenttosignal her typeviaactionstosustain intertemporal barter. Incom-
plete information, introduced for example by assuming a borrower type that values honesty for
its own sake (as assumed by Cole and Kehoe [1992]) is an alternative way to model reputations,
but is not necessary to assure that reputations alone sustain sovereign borrowing.28
In contrast, the ‘‘constant recontracting model’’ of Bulow and Rogoff [1989a] portrays re-
peated simultaneous trade in a bilateral monopoly. In that model, a ‘‘loan’’ is the one-time pay-
ment for a monopoly franchise to the purchase of a country’s exports, and a ‘‘repayment’’ is the
monopsonistsurplusgainedin simultaneous exchangeeach period. In ourmodel, thelender and
borrower trade intertemporally, making payments at different dates throughout the relationship.
This relationship is permanent, even though it is formally manifest as sequence of short-term
debt contracts that are frequently ‘‘violated’’ and ‘‘renegotiated’’.21
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Existence of ¯ < 1 is immediate from the perfection constraints.
That some gains from trade can be sustained in perfect equilibrium is an immediate application
of general results for repeated games. The existence of a b ¯ > 0 such that smoothing is not
possible for b ¯ ¸ ¯ is proved showing that small payments in the two extreme states of nature
cannot satisfy the perfection constraints if ¯ is small but positive. For yt = y1, c1 ¡y1 > 0, for
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Let W n denote the utility possibility set in state n. Define !t ´ (y1;:::;yt) to be the history
of nature. The proposition follows from the following two results: (a) For each state of nature,
yn, the set of all payoffs sustained by some perfect equilibrium, W n, is non-empty, compact and
convex. (b) Its Pareto frontier,V b(V l;yn), is decreasing in V l and contains as its endpoints, two
points given by (¹ V b(yn);0) and (0; ¹ V l(yn)), where ¹ V b(yn) is the maximum of V b over W n and
¹ V l(yn) is the maximum of V l over Wn.
(a) The set Wn is non-empty because it always includes the origin. Compactness can be
proven by application of Theorem 4 of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1990]. Their proof, based
onthenotion of self-generation, arewritten undertheassumption thattheactionspaceisfiniteat
each stage. Careful inspection of their proof reveals that the Theorem is valid for a discounted22
game of perfect information when the action space for each player is a compact interval and
the stage-game payoffs are continuous. Compactness of the set W n for each n follows from
Theorem 4.29 An alternative proof of compactness follows from application of Tychonoff’s
Theorem.
Convexity could be proved by applying Theorem 5 of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1990],
butitissimpler toshowthatthesetof perfectequilibrium paths for any initial stateyn is convex.
Suppose that s and s0 are two equilibrium paths. The convex combination of s and s0 is given
by s¸ ´ fa¸(!t)g1
t=1 where a¸(!t) = ¸a(!t) + (1 ¡ ¸)a0(!t) for every !t and 0 · ¸ · 1.
Since u(c) is concave, V b(s¸;!t) ¸ ¸ V b(s;!t) + (1 ¡ ¸)V b(s0;!t) ¸ 0. Also,V l(s¸;!t) =
¸ V l(s;!t) + (1 ¡ ¸)V l(s0;!t) ¸ 0. Therefore, s¸ is a perfect equilibrium path. Since u(c) is
concave, convexity of W n follows.
(b) That the Pareto frontier of W n is decreasing is straightforward (simply increase ¿(yn) =
al(yn) ¡ ab(yn) in any efficient path providing positive surplus to each agent). Together with
compactnessandnon-emptiness,thisassuresthattherearepointsinW n,(¹ V b(yn);0)and(0; ¹ V l(yn)),
such that ¹ V i(yn) is the maximum of V i(yn) over Wn:
Proof of Proposition 3:
This proof demonstrates that the proposed equilibrium is a strong perfect equilibrium, as
defined by Rubinstein [1980], which is a more restrictive criterion than coalition-proofness as
defined by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston [1987].
For the L + 1 person repeated game, the set of payoffs sustainable using subgame perfect

















where Wn is the utility possibility setfor all perfect equilibria of the two-person repeated game.
Let there be at least two lenders, that is, L > 1. To prove the proposition, we construct a strong
perfect equilibrium that sustains an efficient perfectequilibrium payments path thatgives all the
surplus to the borrower. That is, V b = ¹ V b(yn), V 1 = 0, ..., V N = 0, where ¹ V b(yn) = maxfºb :
(ºb;º1) 2 Wng (this maximal surplus depends on the state of nature for period 1). This path is23
denoted by s = fa(!t)g1
t=1 where a(!t) is the vector of all payments made by every agent to
each other agent in period t contingent on the history of nature through date t, !t ´ (y1;:::;yt).
In the selected path s, only the borrower and lender 1 make any payments and only to each
other. Thesequence of state-contingent payments madeby the borrower andlender 1in this path
are an efficient equilibrium path of unilateral payments for the single-lender case such that the
borrower gets all the surplus in period 1.
Our proposed punishment of the borrower (if she deviates from any ongoing path at date t)
is the perfect equilibrium path starting in period t + 1 that gives all the surplus for the repeated
gamestartingin stateyt+1 tolender1. In thispunishment, otherlenders pay andreceivenothing.
The punishmentof lender 1 for deviating in periodt is a restartof the path s in periodt+1. Call
these punishments, pb
t+1 and p1
t+1, respectively, for all t. Note that pb
t+1 starts if the borrower
deviates from pb
t by not paying lender 1 in period t.
In the paths, s, pb
t+1 and p1
t+1, lenders 2 through L make no payments. Any one of them
deviates by making a payment. No reaction is needed if one of these lenders makes a payment
to any other lender. If one of them makes a payment to borrower during her punishment, then
the agents’ strategies need to react.
Consider a subgame beginning at date t + 1 such that the borrower deviated in period t. Let
lenders 1 through L ¡ 1 behave according to the punishment pb
t+1. Suppose that the borrower
and lender L negotiate some perfect equilibrium payments path for the two-agent game played
beween them from period t + 1 onward other than permanent autarky. Label this path qt+1.
For qt+1 to be a non-autarkic perfect equilibrium path, there must be future events in which it
specifies that lender L pays the borrower. If lender L makes a positive payment to the borrower
at time t0, t0 ¸ t+1, then there must be a subsequent event in which qt+1 requires the borrower
to pay lender L.
Consider a sample sequence of states of nature from t+ 1 to some date t00 > t+ 1, such that
lender L pays the borrower at a time t0 < t00 and the borrower’s first subsequent payment occurs
at t00 following qt+1. In period t00, lender 1 and the borrower can negotiate to start an efficient
perfect equilibrium path with a payment by the borrower to lender 1 that is smaller than her
payment to lender L would be under qt+1. This gives the borrower a higher payoff than she24
can realize by paying lender L. Therefore, she defects from qt+1. The path qt+1 is not proof to
renegotiation between the borrower and lender 1.
The borrower maximizes her surplus by never paying anyone besides lender 1 after she has
defected from the initial payments path, s. This is also true if she has not defected: if lender L
deviates from s by paying her, she can only reduce her surplus by paying him back. Autarky
is the only two-agent perfect equilibrium path for the coalition of the borrower and lender L
that is proof to renegotiation by the coalition of the borrower and lender 1. This holds for every
lender 2 through L. Therefore, lenders 2 through L make no payments ever to the borrower
in the equilibrium for any subgame that can be reached. Consequently, the only payments the
borrower every makes in this perfect equilibrium are to lender 1, and the proposed equilibrium
is a strong perfect equilibrium and, therefore, is coalition-proof.25
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Notes
1Lindert and Morton [1989] examined 1552 external bonds of ten borrowing governments (approximately the top ten bor-
rowers over the past thirty years) outstanding in 1850 or floated between then and 1970, following all through to settlement or
the end of 1983. Defaults were not only common but widespread in their sample; most of the countries had some defaults in
each of the periods 1820-1929 and the 1930s (p. 61). A detailed summary of experience by country is presented in their Table
2.8.
2Eichengreen and Portes [1989b] examined 125 London overseas issues and a sample of 250 United States foreign issues
floated in the 1920’s. (Nearly half of latter, by value, lapsed into default (p. 233)). In their samples, British bonds had an
overall internal rate of return of 5 percent, higher than domestic investments (Eichengreen and Portes [1989a, p. 77], while
United States loans to national governments had an internal rate of return of 4.6 percent, compared to the 4.1 percent yield on
UnitedStatestreasury bondsoverthe 1920s (pp. 35, 38). Theseyieldswere,however,substantially below thoseofferedexante,
which were generally between 7 and 8 percent (p. 27). Overall, the bonds in the Lindert and Morton [1989] sample proved
profitable; the average 2 percent ex ante premium over domestic government bonds became a 0.42 percent permium ex post(p.
77). Further, they find (p. 59), that ‘‘there is no clear evidence of a systematic difference in realized returns" between the onds
of their ten borrower governments and United States domestic coporate bonds.
3Eichengreen and Portes [1989b, p. 234] report that, in their 1920s samples, ‘‘The typical default reduced the internal rate
of return by 4.3 percent for dollar loans, but 1.4 to 2.3 percent for sterling loans." They note, for example, that all sterling loans
to Brazil in that period went into default, but they yielded positive internal rates of return between 1.1 and 2.3 percent.
4See Eichengreen and Lindert [1989].
5Wallich [1943] expresses this view, and Grossman and van Huyck [1988] call such defaults ‘‘excusable’’. The idea that
defaults might not always violate the underlying equilibrium relationship helps explain the findings of Lindert and Morton
[1989] and Eichengreen [1989] that defaulters have not generally suffered subsequent discrimination in credit terms, and also
the finding of Ozler[1993] forloans from 1968-81 that theaveragepenalty forpastdefaults was only asmallfractionof interest
spreads.
6Our model of anarchy in international relations is related to Hirshleifer [1995]. In particular, see p.27. In contrast to
Hirshleifer’s generic model, we assume implicitly that fighting is ineffective for appropriating international resources, as is true
if Hirshleifer’s ‘‘decisiveness parameter’’ is zero.
7Theseincludethe enforcementof tradesanctionsand of creditorseniority privileges either explicitly orimplicitly assumed.
8The many papers that use a reputation for repayment to sustain international lending in infinite-horizon models with com-
plete information include Eaton and Gersovitz [1981], Kletzer [1984, 1989], Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz [1986], Grossman
and van Huyck [1988], Worrall [1990], Atkeson [1991] and Kehoe and Levine [1993]. Papers using using games of incomplete
information include Cole and Kehoe [1992], Cole, Dow and English [1994] and Gale and Hellwig [1989]. All assume some
form of exogenous enforcement.
9Eaton[1990] andChariandKehoe[1993] also pointoutthatBulowand Rogoff [1989b]assumetheexistenceof anexternal
authority to enforce loans made by the borrower but not loans made by the lender, as labelled in their article.
10Models that adopt a consumption-smoothing motive for international financial flows include Eaton and Gersovitz [1981],
Atkeson [1991], Craig [1991], Grossman and van Huyck [1988], Kehoe and Levine [1993], Kletzer [1989 and 1994] and
Worrall [1990]. Cole and English [1992] study expropriation of equity investment in a consumption-smoothing model, and
Kletzer, Newbery and Wright [1992] study loan, futures and options contracts for international smoothing in the presence of
sovereign risk.
11Our approach to modelling credible punishment of sovereigns differs from the analysis of sanctions of Eaton and Engers
[1992] intwo essentialways. The firstisthatthey modelabilateralrelationshipand so arenotconcernedwithourmainissue —
the problem that new entrants might benefit by not cooperating in a punishment. The second is that they study Markov perfect
equilibria of a game in which the power to sanction is exogenous to borrowing and lending, as in Bulow and Rogoff [1989a],
rather than subgame perfect equilibria of a game in which the incentives to cooperate derive from the surplus internal to the30
intertemporal smoothing relationship.
12The borrower’s endowment follows a Markov chain in the working paper version, Kletzer and Wright [1995].
13Important definitions and results for infinitely-repeated games are made by Farrell [1984], Bernheim and Ray [1989],
Farrell and Maskin [1989], Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1993] and Ray [1994]. Pearce [1992] surveys and compares concepts
of renegotiation-proofness.
14Abreu [1988] proves that all perfect equilibria can be found using minmax punishments as done here.
15In the sense that one party’s current payment cannot be conditioned on the other’s current payment.
16Perfect equilibria for repeated games satisfy the principles of dynamic programming as shown most generally by Abreu,
Pearce and Stacchetti [1990].
17Thomas and Worrall study smoothing of a risk-averse worker’s consumption when her opportunity spot wage is stochastic
and the employer cannot be bound to wage contracts. They assume trigger strategy punishments are used by the employer and
worker to enforce the contract. Kocherlakota [1996] solves for a similar equilibrium, supported by trigger strategies, for two
risk-averse agents. His equilibrium could equally well have been used here by assuming a risk-averse lender.







n is the probability of state n.
19If ¯ · b ¯, then c
n = c
n = y
n for every n since consumption smoothing is not possible.
20Note that we can find an initial allocation of surplus such that consumption is smoothed for all periods. Pareto optimal
allocations are achievable for large enough discount factors, but not every efficient perfect equilibrium path is Pareto optimal.
21Grossman and van Huyck [1988] propose this interpretation of sovereign debt renegotiation. They do not impose the
constraint that lenders will not take negative repayments.
22Fernandez andRosenthal[1990]modelthenegotiationofarepaymentinanextensive-formgamewithanexogenousdefault
penalty. They model the one-time termination of a debt relationship, rather than renegotiation in a long-term relationship with
endogenous incentives. Gale and Hellwig [1989] present a similar model with incomplete information about the borrower’s
type.
23Grossman and van Huyck [1989] assert if the borrower’s income is i.i.d. so is her consumption, inconsistent with the
solutionundernon-commitment. Worrall [1990] showsthatconsumptionis not iid outside thesteady state whenthe risk-neutral
agent can commit.
24This proposition demonstrates existence, not uniqueness. For example, Figures 2a and 2b show states of nature such that
the lender’s surplus is zero in the steady state. When these are reached, a new lender could take over smoothing the borrower’s
consumption, and similar punishments to those described in the text enforce the equilibrium.
25In their paper, Bulow and Rogoff note that they make this assumption but write that it is unnecessary for their claim that
reputationalequilibria alone will notwork. See Bulow andRogoff [1989b], page45, lines12-16. Cohen[1991, page 94] makes
asimilar claim inaconsumption-smoothing model. He imposestheconstraintthattheborrower willjustbeindifferentin period
t + 1 between autarky and repayment if she repays in period t. Therefore, repaying in period t can only make her worse off.
There is a problem: the continuation values are fixed rather than derived from equilibria for the subgames reached, so that his
argument does not address whether lending and repayment can be self-enforcing.
26Worrall [1990] solves for the efficient smoothing path in a two-party model under the one-sided commitment assumption
madeby BulowandRogoff [1989b]. Kletzer,Newbery andWright[1992]showhowoptioncontractscanbeusedincombination
with one-period loans to approximate Worrall’s efficient solution.
27Worrall[1990] andAtkeson[1991] explicitly statethisassumption. Theassumption isimplicitinGrossmanand vanHuyck
[1988]. In the Atkeson and Worrall models, the lender’s surplus is negative in some events in equilibrium for the general case.31
28Cole and Kehoe [1992] pursue the possibility, adumbrated in Bulow and Rogoff [1989b], of a reputational equilibrium in
which the borrower is concerned about the implications for her other market relationships of the reputation (the conditional
probability that she is ‘‘honest’’) that she establishes in the loan market. Other models of incomplete information include Eaton
[1990], Cole, Dow and English [1991] and Thomas [1992].
29To apply the results of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1990], the payoffs are first renormalized by multiplying by ¯. Define
the payoff ¯V
i(a, º) as ¯(¼i(a, y) + Eº
n). Let W denote the N-tuple of the sets W
n, fW
1, ..., W
Ng, and º denote the
N-tuple of the continuation payoffs, fº
1, ..., º




º) is maximal with respect to the action ai 2 Ai(y
n), for each agent i = 0, 1. The set B(W) defined by Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti is given by f¯V (a, º)j(a, º) is admissible w:r:t. Wg.